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2352-7714/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.Va b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oAvailable online 26 March 2015 Inﬂuenza A viruses are amongst themost challenging viruses that threaten both human and animal health. Inﬂu-
enza A viruses are unique in many ways. Firstly, they are unique in the diversity of host species that they infect.
This includeswaterfowl (the original reservoir), terrestrial and aquatic poultry, swine, humans, horses, dog, cats,
whales, seals and several other mammalian species. Secondly, they are unique in their capacity to evolve and
adapt, following crossing the species barrier, in order to replicate and spread to other individuals within the
new species. Finally, they are unique in the frequency of inter-species transmission events that occur. Indeed,
the consequences of novel inﬂuenza virus strain in an immunologically naïve population can be devastating.
The problems that inﬂuenza A viruses present for human and animal health are numerous. For example, inﬂuen-
za A viruses in humans represent a major economic and disease burden, whilst the poultry industry has suffered
colossal damage due to repeated outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses. This review aims to pro-
vide a comprehensive overview of inﬂuenza A viruses by shedding light on interspecies virus transmission and
summarising the current knowledge regarding how inﬂuenza viruses can adapt to a new host.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Inﬂuenza A viruses (Family Orthomyxoviridae) impose a large burden
on both human and animal health worldwide. Inﬂuenza A viruses can be
categorised into different subtypes based on genetic and antigenic differ-
ences in the two surface glycoproteins of the virus, the haemagglutinin
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA). Wild waterfowl and shorebirds are the
natural reservoirs of inﬂuenza A virus and can be infected with viruses
harbouring combinations of 16 different HA subtypes and nine different
NA subtypes. Recently, two novel inﬂuenza A virus subtypes (H17N10
andH18N11) have been identiﬁed in rectal swabs collected from the little
yellow-shouldered bat [Sturnira lilium] and the ﬂat-faced fruit-eating bat
[Artibeus jamaicensis planirostris] [1–3]. Inﬂuenza viruses of this subtype
have not been isolated from any other animal order and it is unknown
whether these viruses might be able to cross the species barrier. In con-
trast, there is signiﬁcant inter-species transmission of inﬂuenza viruses
from waterbirds, such that animals ranging from domestic poultry to
humans can also become infected. Accordingly, infection with inﬂuenza
virus has wide-reaching ramiﬁcations. For example, whilst some inﬂuen-
za virus strains are largely asymptomatic in chickens (and are hence re-
ferred to as low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza [LPAI] viruses) others cause. This is an open access article undersevere disease in chickens that is often fatal within 48 h (and are hence
referred to as highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza [HPAI] viruses). Out-
breaks of HPAI viruses can cause devastation for the poultry industry
resulting in themass slaughter ofmillions of birds [4]. Similarly, outbreaks
of inﬂuenza viruses amongst thoroughbred horses have disrupted nu-
merous race meetings and resulted in the death of infected horses [5].
In humans, seasonal inﬂuenza viruses are a signiﬁcant cause of morbidity
and mortality and constitute an economic burden of $10.4 billion dollars
per year in the U.S.A. alone [6]. The diversity and complexity of inﬂuenza
virus infections across so many different animal species suggests that a
one-health approach is the only comprehensiveway to reduce theburden
of disease. Here, we seek to highlight how inﬂuenza viruses spread from
their natural avian hosts to mammals, and what the virus needs to over-
come in order to ensure the success of these inter-species transmission
events. We highlight the consequences that this inter-species transmis-
sion has, not only for humanhealth, but also for the health ofwild animals
and the success of industries such as poultry farming.
Inﬂuenza A viruses in animals
Wild birds as a reservoir of LPAI viruses
Waterbirds and shorebirds of the orders Anseriformes (mainly ducks,
geese and swans) and Charadriiformes (mainly gulls, terns and waders)the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Fig. 1.Reservoirs and inter-species transmission events of lowpathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses.Wild birds, domestic birds, pigs, horses, humans and batsmaintain their own inﬂuenza A
viruses (arrow in circle, subtype in bold). Spill-over events occur occasionally,most frequently fromwild birds (arrow straight, subtype normal font). *H7N7 virus emergedamongst horses
in the 1950s but is currently thought to be extinct.
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In wild birds LPAI viruses predominantly infect epithelial cells of the in-
testinal tract [8,9] and are subsequently excreted in the faeces. Howev-
er, infection of wild birds with LPAI viruses is typically sub-clinical and
occurs in the absence of obvious lesions [10–12]. Every year, LPAI viruses
cause outbreaks amongst waterbirds. These outbreaks are most com-
monly associated with the increased presence of juvenile, immunologi-
cally naïve birds in the population and occur during migration when
contact rates between, and within, populations are high [13]. The rela-
tively high virus prevalence in waterbirds may be due, in part, to virus
transmission through the faecal–oral route via surface waters [7].
Transmission of LPAI viruses to marine mammals
Inﬂuenza viruses from waterbirds can cross the species barrier and
infect numerous other species (see Fig. 1). A recent example of bird-
to-animal transmission is the mortality amongst harbour seals [Phoca
vitulina] of the North-European coastal waters following infection
with the LPAI H10N7 virus [14–16]. Various outbreaks of LPAI H3, H4
and H7 viruses causing severe respiratory disease and mortality
amongst harbour seals have also occurred in the past decades along
the New England coast of the United States of America [17–20]. The
exact transmission route between seals is unknown but it is likely to
occur via the respiratory route, most probably whilst the seals are rest-
ing on land. It is currently unknown if adaptation of inﬂuenza viruses
from waterbirds is needed to allow the virus to infect and transmit
amongst seals. In addition to seals, LPAI viruses have been isolated
from a long-ﬁnned pilot whale [Globicephala melas] and Balaenopterid
whales (species unknown) [21,22], and serological evidence for infec-
tion was reported in various other marine mammal species (for review
see [18]). However, the available data is very limited and it is remains
unclear if LPAI viruses can also cause outbreaks of disease in other ma-
rine mammals similar to harbour seals.Transmission of LPAI viruses to domesticated animals
In addition to transmission to marine mammals, LPAI viruses can
also cross the species barrier and infect domesticated mammals and
birds (see Fig. 1). Swine [Sus scrofa domesticus] have become infected
with H4 and H9 viruses sporadically, whilst LPAI H1 and H3 viruses
are endemic in pigs. Disease manifestations can range from as acute re-
spiratory tract disease to an inapparent infection [23]. Traditionally,
swine infections were considered to be of particular importance be-
cause swine respiratory epithelial cells were thought to express both
α2,3- and α2,6-linked sialic acids [23]. In general, human inﬂuenza vi-
ruses useα2,6-linked sialic acids as a receptor, whereas avian inﬂuenza
viruses attach predominantly toα2,3-linked sialic acids [24]. According-
ly, the presence of both α2,6- and α2,3-linked sialic acids would mean
that swinemay potentially be infected by both avian and human viruses
[23]. Due to its segmented genome, when two different inﬂuenza virus-
es infect a single host, virus gene segments can be inter-changed such
that a novel so-called ‘reassortant’ virus is produced. Pigs were thus tra-
ditionally thought to act as a ‘mixing vessel’ and facilitate the generation
of novel reassortant inﬂuenza viruses. However, recent studies suggest
that there is in fact limited α2,3-linked sialic acid on swine tracheal
cells [25]. Rather, perhaps of greater importance for one health, is
the presence of large numbers of pigs in close proximity to other an-
imal species [26], increasing the risk of an inter-species transmission
event.
Inﬂuenza viruses currently circulating in mammalian species, in-
cluding dogs [Canis lupus familiaris] and horses [Equus ferus caballus],
are also thought to have derived from avian inﬂuenza viruses [27–29].
Viruses of the H3N8 and H3N2 subtypes are currently circulating
amongst dogs [30]. Whilst the H3N2 virus is a recent direct spill-over
from birds, the H3N8 virus has been circulating amongst horses since
at least the 1960s and was established in the dog population in the
end of the last century or the early 2000s [27,31–34]. Both viruses can
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were ﬁrst detected in the 1960s andhave subsequently become endem-
ic [33,36]. The H7N7 virus emerged amongst horses in the 1950s but is
currently thought to be extinct [36]. Interestingly, the H3N8 virus was
also detected in a Bactrian camel [Camelus bactrianus] [37].
Terrestrial poultry can also become infected with numerous differ-
ent LPAI viruses. A subset of the LPAI virus strains (namely H5, H6, H7,
H9 viruses) that infect poultry can subsequently become endemic in
this population [38,39]. Indeed, LPAI viruses appear to adapt upon infec-
tion of terrestrial poultry, as LPAI viruses isolated fromwild birds do not
replicate efﬁciently if used to experimentally infect poultry [40]. In poul-
try LPAI viruses typically cause limited clinical signs [41]. However, un-
like in water birds, LPAI viruses predominately infect respiratory
epithelial cells [42]. Accordingly, it is thought that LPAI virus strains
can also be transmitted amongst terrestrial poultry, roaming in dry
pens at high densities, via respiratory droplets and aerosols [43]. How-
ever, perhaps themost signiﬁcant feature of LPAI virus infection of poul-
try is that in these species that some LPAI viruses are able to evolve into
HPAI viruses.
HPAI viruses in domestic birds
In terrestrial poultry, LPAI viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes can
subsequently evolve to become HPAI viruses by the insertion of a
multi-basic cleavage site in the viral HA. The HA of LPAI viruses is
cleaved by trypsin-like proteins, expressed in the intestinal and respira-
tory tracts of birds. However, the presence of the multi-basic cleavage
site in the HA of HPAI viruses enables these viruses be cleaved by the
furin family of enzymes. These enzymes are distributed throughout
the body hence enabling HPAI viruses to cause a systemic viral infection
[43]. To date, this evolution to a highly pathogenic phenotype has only
been observed in H5 and H7 inﬂuenza viruses. It remains unclear
whether this represents a unique feature of these viral strains, or if
this is simply a chance event. HPAI viruses typically cause a fatal and
systemic infection in terrestrial poultry characterized by severe necrosis
and inﬂammation of multiple organs, oftenwith virus replication in en-
dothelial cells [44]. Upon its evolution in terrestrial poultry, HPAI viruses
can once again cross the species barrier and be transmitted to other
avian and mammalian species.
HPAI viruses in wild birds
TheHPAI H5N1 virus is unusual in so far as it has infected and caused
mortality in a variety of different waterbirds [45,46]. For example, in
2005 therewas an outbreak of theHPAIH5N1 virus in China that result-
ed in a 10% decrease in the global population of bar-headed geese [47].
Wild birdsmost probably become infectedwithHPAIH5N1 virus via the
inhalation of infectious droplets or aerosols and/or contact with
contaminated water [43]. There is also evidence to suggest that wild
birds of prey become infected with HPAI H5N1 viruses following con-
sumption of infected carcasses [48]. In ducks, the extent of disease ob-
served following infection with HPAI H5N1 viruses varies depending
on the duck species in question [49]. For example, whilst tufted ducks
(Aythya fuligula) and pochards (Aythya farina) display neurological
signs upon infection with HPAI virus A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005(H5N1),
no clinical signs were observed in mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), com-
mon teals (Anas crecca), Eurasian wigeon (Anas penelope) or gadwalls
(Anas strepera) infected with same dose and strain of virus [49]. Indeed,
in light of these differences the mallard duck is considered the most
likely candidate for a long-distance vector of HPAI H5N1 viruses, as
this species excretes abundant amounts of virus without showing clini-
cal signs or being debilitated by the disease [49]. Similarly, the high se-
roprevalence of H5N8-speciﬁc antibodies in various duck species
suggest that these animals are able to survive the initial virus infection
and may be involved in the epidemiology of this lineage of HPAI H5 vi-
ruses [50].HPAI viruses in non-human mammals
The HPAI H5N1 virus has also been detected in various animals liv-
ing in captivity, including tigers [Panthera tigris], leopards [Panthera
pardus], a dog, cats [Felis catus], Owston's palm civets [Chrotogale
owstoni] and swine (for review see [51]). H5N1 viruses have also
been detected in a free-living stone marten (Mustela foina) and
an American mink (Mustela vison) [52,53] (for review see [51]).
Infection of carnivores occurs most likely via the ingestion of infect-
ed poultry or wild birds, although there has been evidence of
horizontal transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus amongst tigers [54].
Interestingly, infection of carnivores with the H5N1 virus caused
severe respiratory and systemic disease, often with involvement of
the central nervous system, whilst no severe disease was observed
in swine, both after natural or experimental infection (for review
see [51]).
Influenza A viruses in reptiles
Antibodies were detected against multiple influenza virus strains
in captive species of reptiles and amphibians, whilst influenza vi-
rus RNA was detected in captive crocodilians [55–57]. In addi-
tion, in vitro and in ovo experiments suggest that alligators are
susceptible to infection with avian influenza viruses [58]. Since
birds are evolutionarily closely related to reptiles, identification of
divergent viruses that circulate amongst species of this order
might provide interesting information about the evolutionary his-
tory of influenza viruses.Human inﬂuenza A virus infections
To date, the four best described inﬂuenza A virus pandemics
amongst humans are the 1918 H1N1 ‘Spanish ﬂu’, the 1957 H2N2
‘Asian ﬂu’, the 1968 H3N2 ‘Hong Kong ﬂu’ and the 2009 H1N1 pandem-
ic. These pandemics have been of varying severity and origin. For exam-
ple, whilst the 1918 pandemic virus is thought to be avian descent, the
1968 H3N2 virus was derived from a reassortment event between the
circulating human H2N2 virus and the HA and PB1 genes from avian in-
ﬂuenza virus strain [59]. Although some of these pandemic viruses have
become extinct (such as the 1957 H2N2 virus), others have become
established in the human population and are responsible for seasonal
outbreaks of inﬂuenza virus observed every year [59]. The two seasonal
inﬂuenza A virus strains currently circulating in humans (pH1N1 and
H3N2) cause approximately 500,000 deaths worldwide, with infection
typically manifesting as an acute respiratory tract infection [60]. Thus,
inﬂuenza viruses, and in particular inﬂuenza virus strains that have
been recently introduced into the human population, represents a con-
tinuous threat to humanhealth. The vastmajority of zoonotic events are
restricted to sporadic individual cases, without evidence of sustained
human-to-human transmission. However, the acquisition of human-
to-human transmissibility by a zoonotic virus couldmark the beginning
of a new inﬂuenza virus pandemic.
Avian inﬂuenza viruses that directly infect humans
Zoonotic events
Since the ﬁrst report of transmission of HPAI H5N1 viruses to
humans in 1997, it became clear that as well as infecting a variety of
other species, avian inﬂuenza viruses could also infect humans [61,75–
99]. To date, avian inﬂuenza viruses of subtypes H5, H6, H7, H9 and
H10, have crossed the species barrier and caused human infections
(see Figs. 2 & 3). Of particular concern are the HPAI H5N1 and LPAI
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Fig. 2. Zoonotic events causedby inﬂuenza viruses originating fromavian species. The countrieswhere avian zoonotic infectionswere recordedare indicated in shades of red. * provinces of
China: Shanghai, Beijing,HongKong, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guizhou,Henan,Hunan,Hebei, Shandong, Zheijang. Additionally, two caseswere imported to Taiwan from
mainland China. The intensity of the colour correlates with the intensity of the reported cases. In brackets are indicated the number of fatalities against the number of conﬁrmed cases.
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of disease they cause (see Figs. 2 & 3).
HPAI H5N1 viruses were ﬁrst detected in humans in Hong Kong in
1997. During this outbreak 18 people were infected with six fatalities
[62]. In 2003 and 2004, H5N1 viruses spread from East Asia to South-
east Asia, where sporadic human infections were recorded along
with outbreaks in terrestrial and aquatic poultry [63]. Following an
outbreak of HPAI H5N1 inﬂuenza virus amongst waterfowl at Qing-
hai lake, China, in 2005 [64], H5N1 viruses spread from China [65],
westward to India [65], to Europe [66], and Northern and Central
Africa [67]. In these countries, HPAI H5N1 viruses were detected in
poultry, many species of wild birds and mammals. HPAI H5N1 virus-
es currently represent a major threat to both human and animal
health owing to their unique characteristics. For example, H5N1
viruses represent the only lineage of HPAI viruses that are enzootic
in poultry in many parts of the world, and this has been the case
for over a decade. Quarantining of infected farms, and culling of in-
fected or potentially exposed poultry causes severe damage to the
poultry industry and animal health worldwide, with an estimation
of 400 million of birds culled and economic losses equivalent to
US$20 billion [68]. This continued circulation in poultry led to a diversi-
ﬁcation in different genetic clades, either by reassortment or by accu-
mulation of point mutations (for a review, see [69]). HPAI H5N1
viruses are also exceptional in the diversity of species that they infect,
by the high incidence of zoonotic events and the severity of human
infections that they cause. Indeed, since 1997 HPAI H5N1 viruses have
been reported to infect almost 700 people, with a case fatality rate
close to 60% [70] (Fig. 3). Although a few clusters of human cases
were reported, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been
recorded [71]. Rather, human infections typically occur following close
contact with infected birds [43]. Live poultry markets and backyardproduction with poly-culture farming (i.e. farming more than one ani-
mal species in the same location) have thus played an important role
in the inter-species transmission of HPAI H5N1 viruses and may help
explain, in part, the preponderance of HPAI H5N1 virus infections in
Asia and North Africa [72–74].
In addition to HPAI H5N1 viruses, the emergence of a novel LPAI
H7N9 virus in humans in March 2013 has been a cause for concern.
H7N9 viruses were ﬁrst detected in China and the number of human
cases peaked in April 2013 [93,100]. The incidence of infection subse-
quently declined, most probably due to the implementation of control
strategies such as the closure of live bird markets and increased public
awareness. Indeed, it is thought that the closure of live poultry markets
in Shanghai reduced the mean daily number of human H7N9 virus
infections by 99% [101]. A rise in the number of cases occurred in the
Northern Hemisphere winter of 2013/2014, constituting a second
wave, and cases are still being detected in China, resulting in the third
wave [93]. Both the second and thirdwaves coincided with the inﬂuen-
za season in China. Since the ﬁrst wave of zoonotic events in 2013,more
than 500 laboratory-conﬁrmed human infections, with a case fatality
rate of 36%, have been reported [93]. As a LPAI virus, H7N9 viruses do
not cause severe disease in poultry and therefore circulate undetected,
making it more difﬁcult to contain and/or eradicate outbreaks. Cluster
of human infections with H7N9 have been reported [102], demonstrat-
ing that human-to-human transmission may have occurred. However,
H7N9 viruses do not so far have the ability to transmit efﬁciently be-
tween humans.
Pathogenesis and transmission
The severity of the disease caused by avian zoonotic inﬂuenza viruses
is diverse. Symptoms range from conjunctivitis (often associatedwith the
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Fig. 3. Zoonotic events caused by inﬂuenza H5N1 viruses. The countries where human cases of H5N1 virus infection were recorded since 1997 are indicated in shades of green. LPDR: Lao
People's Democratic Republic. The intensity of the colour correlates with the intensity of the reported cases. In brackets are indicated the number of fatalities against the number of con-
ﬁrmed cases.
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and encephalitis [107–220]. H7N9 andHPAIH5N1 stand out by the sever-
ity of the disease they cause. Indeed, human infections with H7N9 and
HPAI H5N1 are typiﬁed by severe respiratory insufﬁciency and the devel-
opment of ARDS [103]. Histologically this is characterized by diffuse alve-
olar damage (DAD) with necrosis of alveolar epithelium, intraluminal
oedema, ﬁbrin, haemorrhage, neutrophils and increased numbers of alve-
olarmacrophages [104]. In the later stage there is also type II hyperplasia,
interstitial inﬁltration of lymphocytes and plasma cells and ﬁbrosis [105].
Themechanisms underlying inﬂuenza virus-inducedDAD and the associ-
ated respiratory insufﬁciency are both complex and multi-faceted (for a
more extensive list of the key players in damage see [106,107]). One strik-
ing feature of these severe and sometimes fatal inﬂuenza virus infections
is the high levels of pro-inﬂammatory cytokines produced by alveolar
epithelial cells and leukocytes [108]. This has led to the theory that a ‘cy-
tokine storm’ (i.e. an uncontrolled pro-inﬂammatory response) contrib-
utes to disease severity [108]. Interestingly, in vitro infection of primary
human macrophages and alveolar epithelial cells suggests that whilst
H7N9 viruses are more potent inducers of pro-inﬂammatory cytokines
than H1N1 viruses, neither virus strain is as potent as HPAI H5N1 viruses
[109]. This may offer a potential explanation for the differential mortality
observed between H7N9 and HPAI H5N1 infections [109]. However, it is
important to note that exactly how these pro-inﬂammatory cytokines
damage alveolar function remains unclear [106]. Damage may occur in-
directly via the recruitment of speciﬁc leukocyte subsets to lung. Al-
ternatively, speciﬁc cytokines may induce epithelial cell death and
hence facilitate pulmonary oedema. The relative important of these
different mechanisms during infection remains an important area
for future research.The severity of HPAI H5N1 virus infections in humans compared to
other inﬂuenza virus strainsmay be due, in part, to the receptor tropism
of these viruses. As described above, the receptor tropism of inﬂuenza
viruses is determined by the HA, which can bind to either α2,6-linked
sialic acid (typically seenwith human-derived HAs) orα2,3-linked sial-
ic acid (typically seen with avian-derived HAs), or both. In humans,
α2,6-linked sialic acids are strongly expressed in ciliated epithelial
cells (such as those present in the upper respiratory tract, trachea and
bronchus) whilst within the alveolus type II pneumocytes express pre-
dominantly α-2,3 linked sialic acids [110,111]. Accordingly, virus histo-
chemistry has shown that HPAI H5N1 viruses attach predominantly to
non-ciliated cuboidal cells (club cells) in the bronchiole and type II
pneumocytes and alveolar macrophages in the alveoli [24,112–115]. It
is therefore tempting to speculate that avian viruses can cause severe
disease in humans by infecting the cells in the lower respiratory tract,
but that this lower respiratory tract binding pattern limits their trans-
missibility. However, this association between the attachment pattern,
disease pathogenesis and transmission efﬁciency in humans is not
always so straightforward. For example, unlike HPAI H5N1 viruses,
H7N9 viruses attach to epithelial cells of both the human upper and
lower respiratory tract [116]. Although the attachment to cells of the
lower respiratory tract corresponds to the severe disease caused by
H7N9 viruses in humans, the attachment to ciliated epithelial cells of
the upper respiratory tract has not resulted in efﬁcient aerosol trans-
mission amongst humans nor between ferrets, an animal model for in-
ﬂuenza virus transmission [117–119]. In addition, HPAI H5N1 inﬂuenza
viruses with mutations that result in attachment to ciliated epithelial
cells of the upper respiratory tract, did not result in aerosol transmission
in a ferret model [120,121].
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cells of the upper respiratory tract is likely to be necessary, but not sufﬁ-
cient, for efﬁcient viral transmission amongst humans. To further deﬁne
what limits the transmissibility of avian viruses amongst humans, studies
assessing the airborne transmissibility of experimentally generated HPAI
H5N1viruses amongst ferrets have beenperformed [121,122]. In addition
to mutations that were intentionally introduced in the receptor binding
site (RBS) of HA to enhance binding to α2,6-linked sialic acid and de-
crease binding to α2,3-linked sialic acid, both studies found two other
mutations in the viral HA during ferret passage (see Fig. 4). These muta-
tions affected the stability of HA (see below), or resulted in the loss of a
potential N-linked glycosylation site close to the receptor binding site,
thereby increasing virus binding to sialic acid receptors [122,123].
After binding of the HA to sialic acid receptors on the host cells, virus
particles enter the cell through a process called receptor-mediated en-
docytosis. The acidic environment in the endosome triggers a conforma-
tional change of the HA, enabling fusion of the viral and endosomal
membrane, and the subsequent release of the viral genome in the cyto-
plasm. The pH at which the HA undergoes this conformational change
varies between the HA subtypes and virus strains [124]. Interestingly,
the pH of fusion of many avian inﬂuenza viruses is higher (less acidic)
than that of human inﬂuenza viruses [125]. The two mutations that
were identiﬁed in the HA of airborne H5N1 viruses (H110Y, T318I, H3
numbering) stabilized the HA protein, as demonstrated by a lower pH
of fusion, and a higher temperature stability [122,123].
Dozens of othermutations thatmodulate the pH of fusion have been
described, some of which have been proven to change the replication
and transmission in mammals (for an extensive review see Mair et al.,
2014) [126]. For example, lowering the pH threshold of fusion by an
H18Q (HA1) or K58I (HA2) substitution in an avian H5N1 HA resulted
in enhanced replication in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets [127,
128]. The requirement for a low pH of fusion may also explain the lack
of sustained transmission of H7N9 between humans, since the pH of fu-
sion of H7N9 HA is relatively high compared to the HA of human inﬂu-
enza viruses [129].
Althoughmore in vitro data is accumulating on HA stability, onemust
remember that these properties may merely be a surrogate for another
(as yet unknown) phenotype. This phenotype may be the stability of
the HA in aerosols, resistance to drought, stability in mucus or altered
pH in the host environment. For example, studies in humans have
shown that the respiratory tract environment is mildly acidic, with a
mean pH of 6.3, but with a range between pH 5 and 8 [130]. Therefore,
it is possible that an unmodiﬁed avian inﬂuenza virus with a relative un-
stable HA (i.e. pH of fusion around 5.6, as has been demonstrated for
H5N1), might be inactivated by a premature, pH-triggered conformation-
al change before it canbind and enter its target cell in the respiratory tract.
A balanced approach
After virus replication, the receptor-destroying activity of the
NA protein facilitates the release of newly formed virus parti-
cles from the cell surface. An optimal interplay between the
receptor-binding of the HA and receptor-destroying activity of
the NA is required [131]. Changes in the receptor binding activ-
ity can disturb this functional balance, which can be restored
by compensatory mutations in the HA, NA or both. One striking
example of this balance is the concomitant glycosylation of the
HA and NA stalk truncature as the result of adapting to terres-
trial birds [132]. It has also been hypothesised that a fine
balance between HA and NA functions is necessary for proge-
ny virions to be released as single particles, which might be
beneficial for airborne transmission [131]. Providing definitive
experimental evidence to support this hypothesis remains an
important area for future studies.After release of the viral genome in the cytoplasm, and transporta-
tion of the gene segments to the nucleus, the attached viral polymerase
complex consisting of the basic polymerase 2 (PB2), basic polymerase 1
(PB1) and acidic polymerase (PA), needs to produce a high amount of
viral genomes and proteins for the generation of new virus particles.
The high copy rate of the viral genome also ensures the fast accumula-
tion of (potentially beneﬁcial) mutations, a hallmark of a host species
switch by RNA viruses. However, the polymerase activity of avian inﬂu-
enza viruses is strongly restricted inmammalian cells [133]. Avian inﬂu-
enza viruses normally replicate at a temperature of ~41 °C, i.e. the
temperature in the avian intestinal tract, and after transmission to
humans, they need to adapt to replicate at ~33 °C, the accepted temper-
ature for efﬁcient replication in themammalian upper respiratory tract.
PB2 was the ﬁrst polymerase protein in which a mutation that
helped overcome this host restriction was identiﬁed [134]. Whilst
avian inﬂuenza A virus isolates contain almost exclusively a glutamic
acid at position 627 of the polymerase PB2 protein (PB2-E627), this po-
sition is frequently mutated to a lysine in human-derived isolates. Mu-
tation to PB2-E627K is accompanied by improved viral replication at
low temperatures [135,136] and enhanced binding of the viral polymer-
ase to the nucleoprotein in human cells [137], thereby also evading rec-
ognition by the pathogen sensor RIG-I [138]. In addition, PB2-E627K
was shown to be required to confer airborne transmissibility to a HPAI
H5N1 virus between ferrets [121,123]. Notably, fatal infections of
humanswith avian viruses of theH5N1 andH7N9 subtype that retained
the avian like glutamic acid at position 627 of PB2 are frequent [139].
These data suggest that PB2-E627K is not always strictly necessary for
avian viruses to cross the species barrier and infect mammals. Recently,
a PB2-K526R substitutionwas found to increase polymerase activity, es-
pecially in concert with PB2-E627K [140]. Interestingly, this mutation
was found in all subtypes of seasonal inﬂuenza viruses, as well as in
human isolates of H5 and H7 infections, but is rare in avian isolates. In
guinea pigs PB2-D701N could substitute for the lack of PB2-E627K for
contact as well as aerosol transmission [136], possibly by improved nu-
clear import of the polymerase subunit PB2 [141]. Other mutations
known to play a role in host adaptation (increased polymerase complex
activity, or virulence) have been described elsewhere [142–158].
In addition to PB2, features of avian PB1may also restrict thehuman-
to-human spread of avian inﬂuenza viruses. For example, for the ferret
airborne-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus, it was shown that, together
with PB2-E627K, PB1-H99Y increased polymerase activity, by improv-
ing the balance between transcription and replication, a requirement
for efﬁcient airborne transmission between ferrets [123]. Other muta-
tions in the polymerase complex protein, nucleoprotein (which binds
to the viral genome to prevent degradation by host cell enzymes) and
the non-structural protein NS2/NEP may also help avian inﬂuenza vi-
ruses overcome replication restrictions mammalian hosts. Indeed, es-
cape mutants in the viral nucleoprotein can reduce sensitivity of avian
inﬂuenza viruses to the human protein MxAwhich possess strong anti-
viral activity and helps limit viral replication [159–162]. Whilst the ef-
fects of most of these mutations on airborne transmissibility have not
been studied, it is anticipated that these mutations, alone, or in concert
with other (compensatory) mutations may affect transmissibility by
improving viral polymerase activity in mammals.
The recently solved structure of the inﬂuenza polymerase bound to
its promoter [163] may help shed light on location and interplay of
known adaptive mutations as well as those yet to be identiﬁed. A pro-
posed RNA exit channel located between the PB1-subunit and the cap-
binding domain contains most of the adaptive mutations of PB2. For
human inﬂuenza viruses, only PB2-E627K, PB2-D701N, PB1-H99Y and
likely PB2-Q591R could be conclusively associated with efﬁcient trans-
mission and therefore successful adaptation (see Fig. 5) [121,136,158,
164]. As these amino acid positions are located in close proximity with
each other, it remains to be shown if amino acid changes in other
parts of the polymerase can lead to a similar level of adaptation to
mammals.
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Fig. 5. Adaptation of the polymerase complex. The programme PyMOL was used to assign
the indicated subunits PB2, PB1, PA and the inﬂuenza A virus promoter in dark grey, grey,
light grey and yellow, respectively. Characterized domains, aswell as amino acids relevant
for airborne transmission between mammals are indicated. The promoter is bound by
parts of all three polymerase subunits. The template, as well as the nascent strand exit
the polymerase from a cavity, presumably in two different directions. The structural
model of A/little yellow-shouldered bat/Guatemala/060/2010 (H17N10) served as a
basis (PDB code: 4WSB).
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receptors. Amino acids (position 18, 110, 318, 47 (HA2) and 58 (HA2) (H3 numbering), which have been shown to affect HA-stability, and associated transmission in mammals are
highlighted in red. B) Inﬂuenza virus phenotypes which are associatedwith adaptation to mammals, shown for non-adapted and adapted avian inﬂuenza viruses. Top panel: Attachment
of inactivated inﬂuenza viruses to ciliated epithelial cells in ferret upper respiratory tract. Bottom panel: acid stability of HA proteins as measured in syncytia formation assays after expo-
sure to indicated pH.
7K.R. Short et al. / One Health 1 (2015) 1–13Inﬂuenza viruses that infect humans via an intermediatemammalian
host
In addition to being directly infected by avian inﬂuenza virus strains,
humans can also be infected with inﬂuenza virus strains that have
passed through an intermediate mammalian host (e.g. swine) (see
Fig. 6). Indeed, prior to the outbreak of HPAI H5N1 viruses in 1997,
the dogma was that infection via an intermediate host was the only
path bywhich a new inﬂuenza virus strain could enter the human pop-
ulation. Several inﬂuenza virus lineages have become enzootic in swine
populations upon transmission of inﬂuenza viruses from birds and
humans to pigs [165]. Inﬂuenza viruses of H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 sub-
types, as well as reassortants between these enzootic inﬂuenza viruses,
have then crossed the species barrier and caused human infections
[186]. Perhaps the most striking example of a virus that, via swine, can
infect humans was the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus. This virus had a
unique gene constellation combining the genes from human, avian
and swine inﬂuenza viruses [166]. The 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus
was ﬁrst detected in humans in February, 2009 [167]. This virus then
rapidly spread across the globe, infecting between 10 and 20% of the
world's population and eventually replacing the human seasonal
H1N1 virus [168]. Consistent with this efﬁcient transmission, the 2009
pandemic H1N1 virus was able to bind to α2,6-linked sialic acid and
to a lesser extent α2,3-linked sialic acid [169]. However, experimental
studies suggest that transmission determinants of this virus resided in
the matrix gene segment (which encodes the protein (M) matrix (M1)
and proton channel (M2) proteins) as well as the NA [170–172]. It was
suggested that M1 and/or M2 affect the functionality of NA by changing
the virion morphology [173]. Surprisingly, the pandemic inﬂuenza 2009
H1N1 virus did not contain the mammalian adaptation residues 627K
and/or 701N. When the substitutions E627K or D701N were introduced
in pandemic inﬂuenza 2009 H1N1, no differences in virulence or
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Fig. 6. Zoonotic events caused by inﬂuenza viruses originating frommammalian species. The countries where swine zoonotic infections were recorded are indicated in shade of blue. The
orange box indicates the only reported human infection with a seal-origin inﬂuenza virus. The intensity of the colour correlates with the intensity of the reported cases. In brackets are
indicated the number of fatalities against the number of conﬁrmed cases.
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tation markers in PB2 were partially compensated by substitutions
G590S/Q591R, whichmay affect interactionwith viral and/or cellular fac-
tors and promote virus replication in mammals [158].
Despite a high rate of transmission, the mortality rate of the 2009
pandemic H1N1 virus was relatively low: approximately 29 deaths
per 100,000 infections [175]. Interestingly, there were marked differ-
ences in the severity of disease observed during the pandemic [176].
For example, whilst most patients displayed mild, self-limiting symp-
toms some developed ARDS reminiscent of HPAI H5N1 virus infection
[177]. Indeed, somepatients even displayed signs of CNSdisease follow-
ing infection [178,179]. The development of severe respiratory disease
was associated, in part, with the presence of speciﬁc viral mutations.
For example, the D222Gmutation in the HA of the pH1N1 virus was as-
sociated with some severe and fatal infections [180]. This is thought to
relate to an increased preference of these viruses to bind toα2,3-linked
sialic acid and thus infect of cells within the lower respiratory tract
[181]. Severe disease was also associated with the presence of co-
morbidities such as asthma, obesity and pregnancy [182,183]. Indeed,
many of the identiﬁed risk factors were related to a compromised im-
mune system or aerodynamic ventilation problems. Interestingly,
most patients with pH1N1 infectionwere (young) adults with amedian
age of 36 years [184]. This is in direct contrast to seasonal inﬂuenza virus
infections, where it is those in the extreme of agewho are at the highest
risk of severe disease. Monsalvo and colleagues [185] offer an elegant
explanation as to why, at least some, young adults developed severedisease. Monsalvo et al. [185] demonstrated that during the 2009 pan-
demic many middle aged adults possessed cross-reactive, but not pro-
tective, antibodies to the virus. Severe disease was associated with the
ability of these antibodies to form immune complexes and activate the
complement cascade within the respiratory tract [185]. Thus, whilst
the presence of cross-reactive antibodies can protect against disease de-
velopment, non-protective cross-reactive antibodies represent an im-
portant host factor that exacerbates disease development.
In addition to the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus, numerous other inﬂu-
enza virus strains have infected humans via an intermediate swine host.
The vast majority of these reported human cases are located in the
United States (see Fig. 6). Of particular interest is the H3N2 variant
(H3N2v) variant virus. This virus is a reassortant virus which contains
the M gene of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus and the remaining
genes of the North American swine inﬂuenza virus lineage [221]. Since
the ﬁrst documented cases of human H3N2v virus infections in 2011,
over 350 human infectionswith swineH3N2v virus have been reported,
including one death of a person with multiple underlying condi-
tions [222]. Typically, these infections are associated with close contact
with pigs during activities such as care giving, visiting live-animal mar-
kets or fairs [223]. However, a limited number of cases reported no con-
tact with swine, indicating the possibility of limited human-to-human
transmission of H3N2v virus [224]. Indeed, experimental studies in fer-
rets show that H3N2v is capable of replicating in the upper respiratory
tract and transmitting efﬁciently to naïve ferrets via respiratory droplets
[225].
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Finally, it is important to recognise that when a new inﬂuenza virus
strain enters the human population the virus will continue to adapt and
change. For example, the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus, despite already
being transmissible, evolved towards a more acid stable virus due to
an E47K (HA2) substitution which gave rise to a higher infectivity in
ferrets [226]. It remains to be determined how other inﬂuenza virus
strains have evolved during the course of a pandemic. Reassortment
with contemporary inﬂuenza viruses is also possible in order to improve
viral replication and/or transmissibility. It was demonstrated that
reassortment between 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus and seasonal H3N2
virus resulted in increased replication and more severe pulmonary
lesions in ferrets, whilst maintaining the capacity of airborne transmis-
sion [227]. However, this is yet to be recorded in humans. Future
reassortment events are not unlikely since at least three of the four
last pandemic inﬂuenza viruses occurred upon reassortment events be-
tween viruses of diverse origin.
Whereas the inﬂuenza virus HA has an important role in determin-
ing the virus host range and virulence, HA is also themain target of neu-
tralizing antibodies. As a result, amino acid substitutions in the HA
protein can result in escape from antibody-mediated neutralization
[228]. This process is referred to as antigenic drift, and allows the virus
to re-infect individuals that have acquired immunity to previously cir-
culating strains through infection or vaccination. Therefore, once a
new virus is established in the human population, antigenic variants
are expected to emerge as a result of increasing population immunity.
Consistent with this notion, it was recently shown that single amino
acid substitutions near the RBS were sufﬁcient to cause major antigenic
changes during evolution of H3N2 and H5N1 [229,230]. Thus, humans
are not only susceptible to infection with inﬂuenza viruses from a vari-
ety of different sources, but these viruses continue to mutate and
reassort in a constant battle to ensure efﬁcient transmission and evasion
of the host immune response.
Conclusions
The ecology of inﬂuenza virus infections described in this review ex-
empliﬁes the need for, and beneﬁts of, a one-health approach to infec-
tious disease. Indeed, the chance of a human inﬂuenza virus infection
or pandemic is the direct result of a dynamic interplay between animal
health, environmental factors and the immune system of the human
host. Interestingly, despite the wealth of different inﬂuenza virus sub-
types that circulate in birds only a limited number of inﬂuenza virus
subtypes have been detected in humans. This clearly demonstrates
that there are barriers to inter-species transmission. Some of these
barriers may relate to the virus itself. For example, speciﬁc mutations
in avian viruses appear to be necessary in order to ensure efﬁcient
human-to-human transmission. Alternatively, certain environmental
factors may determine the rate of inter-species transmission such as
close contactwith infected animals or contactwith contaminatedwater.
The human-animal interface remains in a constant state of ﬂux and
as our activities continue to change so too will the risk of inﬂuenza
virus infection and inter-species transmission. Indeed, it is perhaps not
surprising that the increase in poultry and swine populations observed
worldwide since the industrial revolution have been associated with an
increased frequency of zoonotic inﬂuenza virus infections in humans
[231]. Currently of particular concern are activities such as cock ﬁghts,
illegal trading of birds, live poultry markets and using poultry faeces
to feed ﬁsh — all of which have been associated with the spread of
HPAI H5N1viruses [232]. Approacheswhich seek to curb theprevalence
of these activitiesmay thus have direct beneﬁts for humanhealth. How-
ever, any attempts to limit such activities must be accompanied by ﬁ-
nancial reimbursement for the relevant stakeholders and take into
account local cultural practices and norms [233]. Moreover, the success
of such preventative measures will depend upon the perceived risk ofan outbreak or pandemic [233]. Thus, one-health solutions must be ac-
companied by campaigns to increase awareness about the potentially
global consequences of inﬂuenza virus zoonosis. Ultimately, it is impor-
tant to recognise that our understanding of the reservoirs and transmis-
sion of inﬂuenza virus continues to change as the virus itself evolves.
This highlights the need for not only sound and up-to-date experimen-
tal studies, but also extensive surveillance and the continued emphasis
on the fact that that human health is directly and inextricably linked to
the health of animals and the surrounding environment.
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